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property owner for its decision-a taking by eminent domain. At least
one writer has pointed out that:
The basis for a more satisfactory approach to inverse condemna-
tion lies in the thought, which appears in many of the cases,
that the purpose behind both inverse and ordinary condemna-
tion is to socialize the burden of loss-to afford relief to the land-
owner in cases in which it is unfair to ask him to bear a burden
that should be assumed by society.100
A municipal policy permitting riot mobs to roam the streets at will,
destroying selected private property, as a conscious effort to avert
further damage to the community as a whole, is a policy which should
be borne by society, rather than the individual property owner. Or, as
the Supreme Court of -the United States has said:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall
not be taken for a public use without just compensation was de-
signed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.' 0 '
RICHARn F. BOYER
JUDICIAL PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTERING COURT-
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENTS
Under the mandates set forth by the Supreme Court in Gideon v.
Wainwright' and Miranda v. Arizona,2 it is required that every accused
charged with a felony shall have the right to counsel regardless of his
financial status. Unless the right to counsel at trial is "knowingly and
intelligently"3 waived, an indigent accused is entitled to court-appoint-
ed counsel. Although this constitutional right is assured by the sixth
amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there appears to be no uniform criterion for determining what
constitutes "indigency." As a result of this lack of uniformity many
problems of criminal justice administration have arisen. This is especi-
ally true in the state courts because of the different procedural systems
of each state. The federal court system does have a uniform procedure,
°Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation, The Constitutional Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3, 8.
:1 'Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (196o).
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81d. at 475. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (competently
and intelligently waived).
NOTES
established by the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,4 but in practice this
procedure is also faced with administrative problems. In both state and
federal courts the problems relating to court-appointment of counsel
can be divided into three primary areas. First, there is no uniform defini-
tion of indigency employed by the courts. Secondly, some courts are
failing to make an adequate inquiry into the financial status of the
accused. Finally, there is confusion with respect to the obligation of a
defendant to pay the expense of his court-appointed attorney in the
form of court costs.
Initially, a definitional base must be established. Certainly, the
dictionary definition5 of indigence serves very little purpose in actual
judicial practice. In fact, the dictionary definition requiring complete
destitution is not viewed favorably by more progressive courts and
authorities.0 Although the Supreme Court has failed to come forth with
any direct mandate defining indigency, there is language in several
cases supporting the view that it does not necessarily mean complete
destitution. In Hardy v. United States,7 Justice Goldberg's concurring
opinion acknowledged the concept put forth by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Crimi-
nal Justice that indigency is a term or concept of relativity.8 The At-
torney General's Committee recommended that the terms "indigent"
and "indigency" should be excluded entirely because of their connota-
tion of complete destitution and their association with welfare laws
and regulations. 9 The Committee suggested that an accused defendant
in a weak financial position should be classified as a person "financially
unable to obtain adequate representation."' 0
'18 U.S.C. § 3 oo6A (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-69).
"BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (Baldwin Cent. Ed. 1946) defining indigent as
"the needy, the poor, those who are destitute of property and the means of
comfortable subsistence"; BLACK'S LAW DicniONARY 913 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) defining
indigent as "one who is needy and poor, or one who has not sufficient property
to furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom he is entitled
to look for support."
OSee, e.g., Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289, n.7 (1964); United States
v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Coor, 213 F. Supp. 955
(D.D.C. 1963) ; In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 6o6, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967);
State V. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313, 250 A.2d 719 (Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1968); State
v. Rutherford, 63 Wash.2d 949, 389 P.2d 895 (1964).
7375 U.S. 727 (1964).
11d. at 289, n.7 citing ATr'y GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND rm ADMIN. OF
FED. Cuam. JUsTIcE, REP. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. Cium. JuSTICE pt.
2(a) at 8 (1963) (Indigence "must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished
accused is not necessarily one totally devoid of means.").
0ATr'Y GEGN. COMMt. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIm. JUSTICE, REp.
ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIM. JUSTICE Pt. 4(d) at 40-41 (1963).
"I1d. at 41.
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In Adkins v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours Co.,1 the Supreme Court,
speaking of eligibility for an appeal in forma pauperis12 in a civil pro-
ceeding, stated that one need not "be absolutely destitute to enjoy the
benefit of the statute."' 3 The Court stressed the unsatisfactory result
which would occur if the beneficiaries of the statute were required to
contribute their last dollar toward payment or security for costs. This
would lead to the undesirable practice of putting the statute's bene-
ficiaries into the category of public charges.14
In order to provide a uniform federal procedure for court-appoint-
ment of counsel for indigents, Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act
of 1964.15 The history of this enactment reveals that the bill as origin-
ally introduced was entitled the Indigent Defendants Act of 1963,10
but the legislation in its final form completely eliminated the words
"indigent" and "indigency."' 7 Instead, the Act speaks in terms of
financial inability to retain counsel.'8 Unfortunately, this legislation
only establishes a uniform procedure and does not provide definite
"335 U.S. 331 (1948).
218 U.S.C. § 1915 (1964) which provides for appeals in forma pauperis, applies
to criminal and civil cases alike. Section 1915(a) reads in part as follows:
(a) Any court in the United States may authorize the com-
mencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment
of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person who makes affi-
davit -that he is unable to pay costs or give security therefor.
"Mr. Justice Black in Adkins expresses the financial status which the Court
felt was appropriate for an appeal in forma pauperis as follows:
We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one can-
not because of his poverty "pay or give security for costs ... and
still be able to -provide" himself and dependents "with the neces-
sities of life." To say that no persons are entitled to the statutes
benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs,
the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and
their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute
in a way that would throw its beneficiaries into the category of
public charges.
335 U.S. at 339.
uld.
"i8 U.S.C. § 3oo6A (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-69).
'-See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2992; Carter & Hauser, The Criminal
Justice Act of z964, 36 F.R.D. 68-69 (1964).
"1See Letter of transmittal from Att'y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy to President
John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2994, 2995.
"8E.g., Sec. 3oo6A (b) involving the appointment process which reads in part as
follows:
Unless the defendant waives the appointment of counsel, the
United States commissioner or the court, if satisfied after appro-
priate inquiry that the defendant is financially unable to obtain
counsel, shall appoint counsel to represent him.
18 U.S.C. § 3oo6A(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-69) (emphasis added).
NOTES
criteria for the determination of financial inability. However, when
read in conjunction with its legislative history, the Act can be said to
imply strongly that financial inability does not mean complete de-
stitution.1 9 In practice this would mean that a defendant need not be
penniless in order to qualify for court-appointed counsel.
Although the foregoing suggests that an inquiry into the defen-
dant's financial condition is necessary, the extent to which such exami-
nation must proceed remains unsettled. In Wood v. United States,20
the accused had filed an affidavit requesting court-appointed counsel.
The district court denied his request, and he appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which affirmed.21 The Supreme Court,
in a per curiam decision, remanded the case for reconsideration be-
cause the record did not "convincingly show" that an adequate inquiry
was made into the accused's financial ability.22 Since Wood involved
prosecution for a federal offense and therefore was subject to the
relevant criteria of the Criminal Justice Act, it is doubtful that the
Wood requirement of adequate inquiry applies to state prosecutions.
Nevertheless, at least one state, in the absence of established state pro-
cedure and direction from the Supreme Court, has voluntarily looked
to the Criminal Justice Act as a procedural guideline.23 But the es-
tablishment of a single standardized inquiry might not satisfy the re-
quirement of adequacy, since the circumstances in each case differ. What
seems to be required in Wood is that on the particular circumstances
of each case, an adequate inquiry should be conducted in order to
determine the accused's true financial abilities. Such an inquiry would
prevent problems like those illustrated by the following case.
In Davis v. Ziem,2 4 appellant had been arrested and charged with
breaking and entering. In accordance with arrest procedures, the
sheriff seized all property in appellant's possession, which included
approximately two hundred and nine dollars in cash. Shortly after his
"See ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIAM. JUSTICE,
REP. ON POVERTY AND THE ADmIN. OF FED. CI m. JusIcE (1963); Letter of Trans-
mittal from Att'y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy to President John F. Kennedy, March 6,
1963, 1964 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2994; Letter of transmittal from Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy to Hon. John W. McCormick, March 8, 1963, 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. 8: ADMIN. NEWS 2993.
m°389 U.S. 2o (1967).
"373 F.2d 894 (5 th Cir. 1967).
22389 U.S. at 2o; accord United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969).
2 In State ex rel. Plutshack v. State Dep't. of Health and Social Ser., 37 Wis.2d
713, 155 N.W.2d 549 (1968), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin looked to the
Criminal Justice Act as a guideline in determining whether counsel should be
appointed for an indigent defendant who was charged with three misdemeanors.
21383 Mich. 717, 178 N.W.2d 920 (197o).
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arrest, the accused was arraigned and the judge, after a brief examina-
tion of appellant's financial status, 25 ordered appointment of counsel,
stating that Davis was "without pecuniary means to employ counsel
to conduct his defense."
26
About eight months after his conviction, Davis petitioned for a
writ of mandamus ordering the return of the money which had been
seized at the time of his arrest.27 The circuit court judge2s denied the
petition and subsequently ordered that the cash be paid to the county
terasurer as partial reimbursement of the fee paid by the county to
Davis' court-appointed attorney. On appeal, the denial was affirmed
by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court of Michigan.29
-The examination by the judge of the accused is reported as follows:
"The Court: Do you have an attorney, Mr. Davis?
"The Respondent: I do not, sir.
"The Court: Do you realize that if you are financially unable to obtain
an attorney by yourself that the court will appoint one for you at county
expense?
"The Respondent: Yes, * *
"The Court: * * * Now, do you wish to have the court appoint an
attorney for you?
"The Respondent: Yes.
"The Court: Are you employed, Mr. Davis?
"The Respondent: I am-
"The Court: Where, sir?
"The Respondent: Was, rather.
"The Court: Where were you working?
"The Respondent: I was working with my brother. * *
"The Court: What kind of work were you doing?
"The Respondent: We were contracting.
"The Court: Do you have any bank accounts?
"The Respondent: At this moment, sir, my finances seem to have
vanished into thin air, disappeared so to speak or used up.
"The Court: Do you have a car?
"The Respondent: I had one.
"The Court: Do you still have it?
"The Respondent: No, sir. * * *
"The Court: Do you own any real estate?
"The Respondent: No sir.
"The Court: Very well, the court will appoint counsel for the
defendant."
178 N.W.2d at 921.
wId.
nDavis' petition correctly alleged that the cash was never utilized or needed
as evidence against him in the breaking and entering prosecution. There was no
question at any time but that the money was Davis' property. See 178 N.W.2d at 921.
2'The circuit court judge hearing Davis' mandamus petition had presided at
Davis' criminal trial. 178 N.W.2d at 921.
017 8 N.W.2d at 92o. The court of appeals treated the appeal as one of
superintendence and the supreme court held that this was proper. Superintendence
is the act of overseeing with the power of direction. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 16o6
(Rev. 4 th Ed. 1968).
NOTES
In Davis, analysis of the facts reveals that the arraigning judge ap-
peared to adopt the relative concept of indigency established by the
Attorney General's Committee and acknowledged in Justice Gold-
berg's concurring opinion in Hardy.30 Further examination reveals,
however, that his inquiry was only oriented toward the assets of the
accused. 31 No inquiry was made into his possible liabilities. 32 Neither
did the judge inquire into the defendant's familial status.33 Had the
judge made these additional inquiries into the accused's financial
status, he then could have weighed this information against the cost
of retained counsel in the locality involved and made a relevant deter-
mination of the accused's financial ability.
3 4
The Supreme Court of Michigan reasoned that had the defendant
disclosed the fact that the sheriff was in possession of the cash to the
arraigning judge, he "properly would have directed its application"
in partial reimpursement of the county's payment of the court-ap-
pointed counsel.35 Since the arraigning judge could have proceeded
in this manner, the court reasoned that the judge hearing the peti-
tion could do so. The court did not consider the adequacy of the
financial examination involved. Its decision rested solely on the dis-
cretionary power of the judge. In spite of the fact that the appellant's
money was, on the record, his only worldly possession, the court saw no
impropriety in requiring reimbursement of the entire amount and
leaving the petitioner destitute.
It is true that the determination of the defendant's eligibility is
'The arraigning judge used the phrases "financially unable to obtain an
attorney by yourself" and "without pecuniary means to employ counsel." 178
N.W.2d at 921.
3For a discussion of the factors involvd in determining who is an "indigent"
see generally L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR (1965); ABA Comm. ON
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES (app. draft 1968); Oaks, Improving the Criminal Justice Act, 55
A.B.A.J. 217 (1969); Stifler, Determining the Financial Status of the Accused, 54
ILL. BJ. 868 (1966).
'See In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 6o6, 427 P.2d 179, 187, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587 (1967);
State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313, 25o A.2d 719, 721 (Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Bolds
v. Bennett, - Iowa -, 159 N.W.2d 425 (1968); State v. Rutherford, 63 Wash.
2d 949, 389 P.2d 895, 899-9oo (1964).
'See Adkins v. E. I. Dupont de Memours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 39 (1948); United
States v. Coor, 213 F. Supp. 955, 956 (D.D.C. 1963); In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 6o6,
427 P.2d 179, 187, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587 (1967); State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313,
25o A.2d 719, 721 (Cir. Ct. App. Div. 1968); Bolds v. Bennett, - Iowa -, 159
N.W.2d 425, 428 (1968).
'See In re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 6o6, 427 P.2d 179, 187, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579, 587 (1967).
See generally, Hearings on S. 1461 Before the Subcom. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, gist Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3 at 99 (1969).
W1 7 8 N.W.2d at 922.
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properly within the discretion of the judge. Nonetheless, it has been
held that such a finding cannot be "blindly accepted" when a con-
stitutional right relating to fair and equitable administration of crimi-
nal justice is involved.3 6 In Davis the Michigan court emphasized that
the civil action of mandamus was involved, not a criminal or quasi-
criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the attendant civil principles of
equity, justice, discretion and the rules of estoppel were applied.3 7 The
court found no absolute legal right in the petitioner, but did indicate
that the result might be inequitable.38
If the authority of the judge hearing the mandamus action is to be
equated to that of the judge presiding at the arraignment, as the
Michigan supreme court did in Davis, it would follow that the former
must consider the criminal procedure aspects in making his subsequent
order. However, there was no consideration given to the question of
whether or not an adequate inquiry had been conducted into the ac-
cused's financial ability, as was required by the Supreme Court in
Wood. Instead, the Davis decision rested upon speculation as to what
the assaigning judge would have done had he known of the petitioner's
money. This seems inconsistent with the rationale of another court that
"[m]ere innuendo, suspicion or conjecture" that a defendant may be
able to advance costs is insufficient.39 It would appear that an examina-
tion by the supreme court in Davis would have disclosed that a proper
inquiry had not been conducted. Assuming that an adequate inquiry is
conducted initially,40 the arraigning judge may or may not find the
accused financially unable to retain counsel. Alternatively, he may find
that the accused was able to pay part of the expense.
41
As previously stated, the financial examination of the accused con-
ducted by the arraigning judge was directed only toward the defen-
dant's assets. By appointing counsel for the accused, the arraigning
judge did fulfill his Gideon obligation. In light of this fact, it was not
EState v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 389 P.2d 895, 899 (1964); accord, State
v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, 759-60 (Cir. Ct. App. Div.), appeal
denied, 22o A.2d 771, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
3178 N.W.2d at 922.
38id.
"*State v. Rutherford, 63 Wash. 2d 949, 389 P.2d 895, 899 (1964).
4°If an adequate inquiry was not made by the arraigning judge, the judge
making the reimbursement order would not appear to inherit the power at a later
time, to deny the petition and make his order. Furthermore, the first judge's
examination of Davis' financial position proceeded no further than discovery of
the two hundred and nine dollars. Therefore, the judge making the reimbursement
order, like the arraigning judge, would have had information only related to the
accused's assets.
"See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 2o (1967).
NOTES
absolutely necessary for the judge to conduct a complete financial in-
quiry. Nonetheless, such an examination certainly would have bene-
fitted the judge making the subsequent order for reimbursement since
the latter judge would have had a more complete record on which to
base his decision. The unusual facts in Davis therefore reveal further
confusion in the court-appointment procedure-the possibility of two
proceedings.
The first proceeding in Davis was the arraigning judge's original
examination of the accused's financial ability which resulted in ap-
pointment of counsel for the defendant, satisfying the Gideon sixth
amendment right to counsel. The second proceeding in Davis would
appear to have been the second judge's reimbursement order, rather
than the mandamus action, although the supreme court apparently
considered the reimbursement order part of the mandamus action.
42
It is not denied that mandamus is a civil action to which the attendant
civil principles apply. However, instead of being part of the mandamus
action it would seem that the judge's decision on reimbursement
would be analagous to that of the arraigning judge determining the
financial ability of a criminal defendant.43 In other words the indi-
gency question has been divided. The arraigning judge, instead of
deciding the complete question, only decided that counsel would be
appointed. Since the first judge only decided the eligibility issue, the
judge making the reimbursement order was -in fact deciding the cost
issue. That is, the question before him was whether the accused should
be required to make contribution towards the expense of his appointed
attorney.
Since the right of contribution in Davis involved the appropriation
of the money in possession of the sheriff, the reimbursement order in-
volved a taking of the accused's property. It would follow that any
proceeding concerning an accused's duty to make contribution in-
volves more than the Gideon right to counsel. The due process re-
quirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 44 would appear to be equally applicable.
In Mullane the Court proclaimed the minimum requirement under the
Due Process Clause to be that any deprivation of property by adjudica-
tion must be "preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropri-
'2See 178 N.W.2d at 921-22.
'1 The Michigan court seems to contradict itself on this point, on the one
hand stating that this was not a criminal proceeding while on the other hand
holding that the judge hearing the mandamus acted validly because the arraign-
ing judge had the authority to proceed. See 178 N.W.2d at 922.
"339 U. S. 306 (1950).
1.971]
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ate to the nature of the case." 45 In Davis it would seem that these
requirements have not been met. Since the mandamus petition was in-
stigated by Davis' own action it could be argued that he was aware
that his property might be taken since his petition had been denied.
It is doubtful, however, that this awareness was sufficient to meet the
notice requirement in Mullane for the reason that the "taking" oc-
curred after denial of the mandamus and concerned the question of
contribution by an accused for his court-appointed counsel.
As to the Mullane hearing requirement, it would seem that there
could be no question that this right had not been afforded to Davis in
the second proceeding. Here, the "adequate inquiry" requirement of
Wood would appear to be the only satisfactory criterion "appropriate
to the nature of the case." Since the arraigning judge's inquiry con-
cerned the question of whether to appoint counsel, the judge making
the reimbursement order could not rely on that hearing for any more
than the information as to the accused's assets. Yet examination of
assets alone is not sufficient to constitute an adequate inquiry.46 In
order for the judge to have met the Mullane hearing requirement he
would have had to conduct a more thorough investigation of the ac-
cused's financial ability.
47
While the adequate inquiry requirement in Wood has not been
directly applied to the states, reason would see mto dictate that such
inquiry into the financial status of the accused is a necessary incident
for protecting the "fundamental right" to counsel guaranteed by
Gideon.48 The right to appointed counsel in federal felony cases was
"5339 U.S. at 313.
"Note 31 supra.
'Underlying the discussion of these two proceedings is the consideration that
there are also two different standards involved. The first standard would involve
ascertaining a financial status which the accused must be below if counsel is to
be appointed; if the accused's position is above that status, then appointment
should be denied. Secondly, assuming that counsel is appointed, there would be
another financial standard for determining whether the entire cost of the appoint-
ment will be borne by the government or whether some contribution by the
accused would be in order. If contribution is ordered, a comparative set of stand-
ards would be necessary in determining the degree of contribution to be made.
It would seem that in deciding the question of eligibility under the first standard
a complete financial examination would not be required in every case. However,
on the question of contribution a complete financial inquiry would be a necessity
for the judge to make a fair decision.
"In Gideon, Mr. Justice Black explained the fundamental nature of the right
to counsel as follows:
We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior
cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental
and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was
NOTES
established in Johnson v. Zerbst;49 however, it was not until after the
Supreme Court decided Gideon that Congress provided a satisfactory
federal procedure for administration of these court appointments. The
primary purpose of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 was to protect
every accused's sixth amendment right to counsel in federal criminal
cases regardless of his financial status.50 The legislative history of the
Act reveals that Congress was directly concerned with the Johnson
and Gideon decisions.51 Congressional recognition of these cases is
important in that it indicates what this body deemed necessary to com-
ply with the Supreme Court's sixth amendment holdings. Although
congressional interpretation is by no means binding on state courts,
it may provide a significant indicator of the nature of future decisions,
since the Supreme Court could hardly ignore the interpretation and
application by Congress.
Even in light of the Criminal Justice Act, there are still instances
in federal cases where the proper meaning of financial inability has
been confused. In United States v. Cohen52 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that the
district court had not met the adequate inquiry requirement of Wood.58
In the district court, the financial examination of the accused pro-
ceeded no further than discovering that he had an undetermined equity
in land.5 4 On appeal, Cohen, still claiming indigency, filed an affidavit
wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.
372 U.S. at 342.
"'304 U.S. 458 (1938).
O°See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2991, which states that the purpose
of the bill is to "provide legal assistance for indigent defendants in criminal cases
in the courts of the United States." See also lo9 CONG. REC. 14,222 (1963), in
which Senator Hruska, speaking for the Judiciary Committee, states that "no
effort was spared to develop and devise a very effective piece of legislation so as
to meet the requirements of the sixth amendment...."
mSee Letter of transmittal from Att'y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy to President
John F. Kennerdy, March 6, 1963, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 2994; 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. &, ADNsN. NEws 2999 (Separate views of Representative John V.
Lindsay). See also 1o9 CONG. REc. 14,222 (1963) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
"0419 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1969).
5Id. at 1127.
"The examination of the accused in the district court is reported as follows:
"Q. [By Mr. Nelson, Assistant United States Attorney] All right. Now
before proceeding any further we note you are appearing in Court with-
out an attorney. Do you have an attorney to represent you in this case?
A.[By appellant] No.
Q. Do you have money with which to hire an attorney if you desired
19711
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of financial status seeking appointment of counsel, and the appellate
court appointed counsel for him.
The appellate decision contains two points of interest. First, since
Cohen sought court-appointed counsel for his appeal, the case includes
a report of the determination made by the appellate court of the ac-
cused's financial ability.55 As such, the case is an excellent illustration of
the concept that possession of assets alone does not automatically dis-
qualify an accused from eligibility for court-appointed counsel. The
court of appeals made a comprehensive examination of the value of
the accused's assets by reviewing the incumbrances and liens on them
and the extent of the accused's other liabilities. After examining ap-
parently the same facts with which the district court had been faced, the
court appointed an attorney to represent the accused on his appeal.
Secondly, Cohen gives a critique of the lower court's financial inquiry
which not only indicates the errors in that court's examination, but
A. Well, not that hasn't been committed.
Q. [By the District Court] What do you mean by that? I don't under-
stand it.
A. Well, I am buying some land, and I put up all my belongings for
security.
Q. But you do have some land?
A. Yes.
Q. How much?
A. More than 16o acres.
Q. How much more?
A. 1,52o acres.
Q. And located where, Hayes County or Lincoln County-?
A. Lincoln and Hayes County; and Colorado.
Q. Well then the fact of the matter is you have got money enough to hire
a lawyer.
A. I wouldn't say that, your Honor.
Q. * * * I think you should consider the question of whether you
shouldn't hire counsel. And I have a notion, having been raised in the
adjoining county of the counties you have mentioned that if you have as
much land as you have there you could hire counsel if you wanted to.
A. Well, I wouldn't-I don't think it would be very wise to be lying
to you, your honor if I had the money I have this committed.
419 F.2d at 1125.
511n Cohen, the appellate court found, on the basis of an uncontested affidavit,
that the appellant had an indefinite 'equity' in 1,52o acres of which he was not
presently the owner but might have a cause of action against the titled owner.
The court also discovered that the appellant had a disputed interest in ASOS
'wheat certificates' with a face value of $4,100. Furthermore, the defendant's home-
site worth $5oo-$75o was encumbered by a tax lien for $56o. His 1964 automobile
was mortgaged for an outstanding bank loan in excess of $sooo. The court
also established that the appellant had other liabilities of $So,75o and that he only
had $2oo cash on hand. 419 F.2d at 1126.
NOTES
also provides, by implication, an explanation of the concepts and
policies underlying its own determination. The appellate opinion
stated that the district court had failed to fulfill its duty to make
further inquiry to determine whether the defendant's apparent asset
of an unspecified interest in real estate so exceeded his outstanding
liabilities that he could in fact afford to employ an attorney.56 The
court emphasized that the assumption of adequate liquidity from the
appellant's statement that he was buying some land, coupled with the
district court judge's personal knowledge of the land value in the
area, was not sufficient to ensure the appellant's sixth amendment right
to counsel.57 The concept of relative indigency was followed and the
point was stressed that indigency is not necessarily equatable with
destitution.5s
Assuming that an adequate inquiry is conducted in light of the
relative concept of financial inability, the question arises as to what
extent the state can include the expense of such counsel in the costs
assessed against the defendant. It would seem that to burden the indi-
gent with reimbursement of the costs of his court-appointed counsel
would defeat the purpose of the initial appointment. Since payments
by the state to appointed counsel are generally less than fees chargd
by privately retained counsel, it would follow that reimbursement of
costs by the indigent to the state would be a lesser burden than pay-
ment to retained counsel.59 Nevertheless, the question would still re-
main whether or not it was the intention of the Supreme Court in
Gideon that the defendant who is found to be unable to retain counsel
should be responsible for this expense at all.
Mr. Justice Black, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Gideon,
419 F.2d at 1127.
nIn Cohen, Judge Matthes, delivering the opinion of the court stated:
The assumption of adequate liquidity from appellant's bald
statement of "I am buying some land," coupled with the court's
personal knowledge of land values in the area of. appellant's
acreage, is not sufficiently "appropriate inquiry" to ensure the
appellant's Sixth Amendment right.
419 F.2d at 1127.
5Judge Matthes, in explaining the meaning of indigency under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 and the sixth amendment, stated that "indigency in that sense
is not necessarily equatable with destitution. Rather, the status comprehended is
a more realistic one." 419 F.2d at 1127.
WE.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 12A (1970 Supp.) ($5oo maximum in Prince
George's County); VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-184 (1970 Supp.) ($4oo maximum for de-
fending crime punishable by death or more than 2o years; $2oo maximum for
other felonies); W.VA. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-1 (1970 Supp.) ($5o for defending felony).
But see, N.Y. CouNTY LAw § 722(b) (McKinney i97o Supp.) (maximum $15oo where
crime is punishable by death, $5o0 for other felonies).
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declared that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."60 Likewise, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking of the preinter-
rogation right to counsel in Miranda, stated that "if [the accused]
cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him."61 The language
in both cases includes the phrase "provided for him," which strongly
implies that this service should be without charge to the indigent de-
fendant. Since the above-quoted passage in Gideon is immediately
followed by Justice Black's reference to the vast amount of money
spent by the federal and state governments to prosecute alleged crimi-
nals,62 it may be inferred that the expense of assuring an adequate de-
fense should also be borne by the various governmental entities. How-
ever, it remains a practice in many states to appoint counsel for indi-
gent defendants and then to assess the cost of the appointment against
the defendant.63
0'372 U.S. at 344.
61384 U.S. at 474.
"Mr. Justice Black states:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to
protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there
are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indica-
don of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right to one charged with crime to
counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great em-
phasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every de-
fendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.
372 U.S. at 344.
63See Woodberry County v. Anderson, - Iowa -, 164 N.W.2d 129 (1969); State
v. Konvalin, 181 Neb. 554, 149 N.W.2d 755 (1967); Witherspoon v. Belt, 177 Ohio
St. 1, 2o1 N.E.2d 590 (1964); Ex Parte Wilson, 89 Ohio LAbs. 575, 183 N.E.2d 625
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Wright v. Matthews, 3o9 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158, 159 n. (1968);
VA. CoDE ANN. § 14.1-184 (1970 Supp.).
I4VA. CoDE ANN. § 14.1-184 (1970 Supp.) provides in part; "If the defendant is
convicted, the amount allowed by the court to the attorney appointed to defend
him shall be taxed against the defendant as part of the costs of the prosecution .... "
See also W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 62-3-1 (1970 Supp.) provides: "The amount so paid,
in the event the accused shall not prevail, shall be and constitute a judgement of
said court against the accused to be recovered as any other judgement for costs."
NO TES
For example, in Virginia there is a statutory provision authorizing
the assessment of costs against a convicted individual for whom counsel
was appointed. In Wright v. Matthews, 5 a convicted indigent filed a
writ of habeas corpus directing his release from a state farm where he
was being confined solely to pay the costs of his criminal prosecution. 6
A substantial part of the cost involved was for court-appointed counsel
in the county and circuit courts. 67 The court awarded the writ on the
grounds that costs assessed against a person convicted of a crime are
not part of his punishment for the crime, and therefore, the imprison-
ment for non-payment of costs violated the involuntary servitude pro-
hibition of the thirteenth amendment.68 The Virginia court, however,
did not consider the validity of assessing the cost of counsel against an
indigent.
If adequate determination of the accused's financial status is made,
some reimbursement may be in order. Partial reimbursement of court
expenses appears proper when the accused's financial position is such
that, while he cannot afford the full fee of retained counsel, his re-
sources are sufficient to justify some contribution. This consideration
was demonstrated in the Wood case where, after the Supreme Court
had remanded for reconsideration, it was decided that counsel should
be appointed with Wood to pay part of the expense.69 Furthermore,
the Criminal Justice Act provides a procedure for such circumstances.7 0
Contra, NEW Max. STAT. ANN. § 41-22-4(B) (1969 Supp.) provides that: "the presid-
ing officer shall clearly inform the person so detained or charged of the right of a
needy person to be represented by an attorney at public expense."
662o9 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
OJustice Gordon of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia described
Wright's situation as follows:
The State's sole ground for detaining Wright is his failure to
pay these costs. If the costs had been paid, Wright would have
been released on September 11, 1967; if the costs remain unpaid,
-he will not be released until July 29, 1970. Wright is indigent and
unable to pay costs.
163 S.E.2d at 159.
77See 163 S.E.2d at 159 n.a. Of the total cost of $1,064.75 assessed against
Wright, $675.00 were fees paid to his court-appointed attorneys.
OCf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), where the United States Supreme
Court recently held that imprisonment of an indigent for fines or cost beyond the
maximum statutory sentence for the particular crime, violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
0Wood v. United States, 413 F.2d 437, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
924 (1969).
7°Sec. 3oo6A(c) provides:
If at any time after the appointment of counsel the court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the case finds that the defendant is financially
able to obtain counsel or to wake partial payment for the repre-
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While these provisions apparently have been applied in only one in-
stance,71 their inclusion in the Act would seem to indicate an intent to
cover those defendants who would fall on the borderline between
complete financial inability and financial ability.7 2 This inclusion
would also seem to indicate that Congress contemplated three types of
defendants: those who can retain counsel on their own; those who
cannot afford to retain counsel on their own, but who are capable of
making some contribution toward such costs; and those who are
financially unable to pay anything and for whom counsel should be
provided at public expense.
In conclusion, it would appear that the problems confronting the
courts in cases such as Davis and Cohen could have been avoided if
proper examination of the accused's financial abilities had been made
initially in the trial court. In absence of any specific directions from
the Supreme Court as to the correct method of judicial administration
for court-appointed counsel for indigents, courts should make a realistic
inquiry into the financial status of the accused. Such inquiry is, it
would seem, a fundamental procedure necessary to prevent violation of
the constitutional right to counsel. In light of the "adequate inquiry"
standard set out in Wood and the "provided for" language of Mr.
Justice Black in Gideon, it can be said that state procedure in many in-
stances is not being employed in a manner which protects the rights of
indigents as envisioned by the Supreme Court.
BENJAMIN A. WILLIAMS III
sentation, he may terminate the appointment of counsel or
authorize payment as provided in subsection (f), as the interests of
justice may dictate.
18 U.S.C. 3oo6A(c).71Other than Wood, no other cases were found in which a court has decided
that the defendant should pay part of the costs. See Oaks, Improving the Criminal
Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217, 219 (1967).
72See Letter of transmittal from Att'y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy to President
John F. Kennedy, March 6, 1963, 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2994-95.
